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Abstract 
Higher education is the education level under the most pressure to be 
internationally liberalized. Currently, the main global instrument to achieve this 
liberalization goal is the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO). In this article, the process of trade 
liberalization of higher education in the GATS framework is examined. The 
analysis is divided in two main parts. First, the state of the current situation of 
higher education liberalization and that of other education sectors are reviewed 
and compared. Second, the factors that influence the undertaking of liberalization 
commitments on education, specifically higher education, are analyzed. To make 
these comparative analyses, EduGATS, a novel index to measure the degree of 
liberalization of educational services is introduced. 
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Introduction1 
Trade in Higher Education has increased its weight in world trade since the nineties. 
Higher education is the education level outstandingly more present in trade flows 
(Larsen and Vincent-Lancrin 2002). In fact, higher education has become one of the 
main services exportation industries in countries such as Australia, New Zealand and 
the USA (Larsen, Martin et al. 2002). Consequently, some governments and the higher 
education industry are increasingly interested in the elimination of barriers to education 
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trade. One of the main instruments to reach this objective is the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS) of the World Trade Organization (WTO).  
At present, the 151 member countries of the WTO are negotiating the 
liberalization of Higher Education and other educational services in the Doha Round 
framework. Even so, the liberalization of educational services within the GATS took its 
first steps during the Uruguay Round of GATT (1986–1994), when 28 countries 
established the first commitments on education liberalization in the framework of a 
trade agreement.  
My research aims to compare higher education liberalization with that of other 
education sectors, as well as to analyse the causes of the liberalization of Higher 
Education, and education in its broadest sense, within the GATS. Specifically, the 
research focuses on the factors that influence the establishment of liberalization 
commitments. The suggested factors are the economic inequalities between member 
countries and specific characteristics of these countries’ educational systems (level of 
privatization of educational spending, weight of the private sector, among others). The 
indicators for each variable are specified below. 
The article is divided into four parts. In the first section, the GATS negotiation 
methodology, its architecture and its contents are briefly examined. Second, by taking 
into account the data previously presented, I construct the EduGATS index. EduGATS 
aims to measure the degree of commitment to educational liberalization undertaken by 
member countries of the WTO. After, the higher education liberalization commitments 
consolidated by member countries are reviewed and compared to the liberalization 
commitments undertaken in other education levels (primary, secondary, adults and 
other). Finally, the factors that influence the liberalization of educational services are 
analyzed through qualitative and statistical correlation techniques. When making this 
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analysis, I will focus on the liberalization commitments consolidated by the WTO 
member countries. I will not consider the provisional results of the Doha round, as this 
round, after several deadlines being lost, has not yet finished and, consequently, new 
commitments have not arisen. 
The sources of the primary data are the lists of liberalization commitments on 
services of the WTO members (which are available in the ‘WTO Services Data Base’, 
see: http://tsdb.wto.org/wto/WTOHomepublic.htm), exploratory interviews with trade 
delegations from member countries (Brazil, Mexico, Venezuela and Chile), position 
documents on the education sector (USA, Australia, New Zealand, Japan and 
Switzerland) and documents from the WTO Council for Trade in Services as well as 
from the Secretariat. The data was collected between June 2005 and June 2006. 
 
1. Brief introduction to the GATS negotiation process 
The GATS is one of the main agreements of the WTO. Its main aim is to expand the 
world trade in services by means of establishing a progressively liberalized multilateral 
framework of principles and rules for trade in services. The GATS promotes the 
liberalization of twelve service sectors, among which there are the educational services. 
Services sectors are, in turn, composed by different sub sectors. Higher Education is one 
of them. Specifically, the educational sub sectors are: 1) primary education; 2) 
secondary education; 3) higher education; 4) adult education; and 5) other educational 
services. 
The architecture of GATS is more complex than the architecture of trade 
agreements on goods, due to the technical difficulties associated with the 
commercialization of services. It has to be acknowledged that services are usually 
consumed where they are produced and are both produced and consumed 
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simultaneously (Francois and Wooton 2000). Given these difficulties, it has been 
established that there are four modes of trade in services. These are: 1) Cross-border 
supply: provision of a service at a distance. In the case of education, this mode is seen in 
e-learning or in other distance learning programmes; 2) Consumption abroad: the 
consumer – in our case the student – travels to another country to access the service; 3) 
Commercial presence: the service company sets up a subsidiary abroad. For example, a 
university sets up a campus abroad; 4) Presence of natural persons: a professional 
(researcher or teacher) travels to a foreign country to provide a service. The 
liberalization of services is negotiated on the basis of these four modes, hence markets 
may be opened in one of the modes but not in the other three. 
Additionally, it should be pointed out that the liberalization of services 
stipulated by GATS means the establishment of commitments on trade opening with 
reference to two clauses: National Treatment and Market Access. The acquisition of 
commitments on liberalization in terms of National Treatment means accepting that 
foreign providers benefit from treatment ‘not less favorable’ conditions than those given 
to domestic companies. This implies that foreign suppliers cannot be discriminated. 
While the commitments on Market Access mean the elimination of barriers (rules, 
regulations laws, etc.) that hinder the entrance of foreign services providers in the 
domestic market. Referring to National Treatment there are limitations such as: a) Taxes 
and levies; b) Subsidies and grants; c) Other financial restrictions; d) Requirements on 
nationality; e) Requirements on residency; f) Qualifications, licenses, standards; g) 
Requirements on registration; and h) Requirements on authorization. On the other hand, 
the limitations which may be established/eliminated in Market Access are: a) Number 
of services suppliers which are allowed access; b) Value of transactions or activity; c) 
Total number of service transactions or total sum of service production; d) Total number 
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of natural persons who may be employed in a sector or by a specific supplier; e) 
Specific type of legal form or personality of suppliers; and f) Establishment of specific 
percentages of participation for foreign capital or the total value of foreign investments.  
Additionally, there are a series of principles that are not subject to negotiation. 
This would be the case with the general obligations and disciplines, such as the Most 
Favored Nation (article II) and Transparency (article III). The Most Favored Nation 
rule stipulates that each member will immediately and unconditionally assign service 
suppliers of a foreign country a treatment no less favorable than that given to service 
suppliers of any other member country, while transparency obliges countries to 
guarantee service suppliers access to information related to trade in services (laws, 
regulations, rules, etc.). 
The GATS, in contrast to other WTO agreements, is not a closed agreement. 
Rather, it is a legal framework and a system of rules that allow WTO member countries 
to adopt commitments on trade liberalization by means of successive negotiating 
rounds. On paper, GATS only obliges member countries to participate in negotiations; it 
does not oblige them in the process of such negotiations to liberalize their services.  
I now look at various relevant issues to better understand the logic of GATS and 
the negotiating process.  
 
Methodology of the GATS negotiations 
 
GATS negotiations take place within the Council for Trade in Services of the WTO 
(Larsen, Martin et al. 2002). There are different types of negotiations with different 
contents and procedures that are being developed in the framework of the Council for 
Trade in Services (rules, domestic regulation, modalities, etc.). Nevertheless, the bulk of 
the negotiation is centered on trade liberalization. This area is negotiated based on the 
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method of demand-offer. It means that during the negotiation period, the member 
countries demand to the other countries to liberalize those sectors where they have 
exportation interests. In response to the demands, the countries also present offers of 
liberalization that are able to be modified depending on the evolution of the negotiation 
process itself. The round finishes when members present a definitive list of offers that 
will be integrated in the GATS as a part of the new liberalization commitments of the 
member countries. All member countries are obliged to submit a list of commitments on 
liberalization, but they do not have to include improvements with respect to the 
previous list, nor new commitments on liberalization (Verger, 2008). 
The lists of commitments inform us about the degree of opening up to trade that 
the member countries assume in each of the various service sectors. Concretely, the lists 
specify the limits that the countries decide to maintain or eliminate in the areas of 
National Treatment and Market Access. Additionally, the commitments and limitations 
are expressed in terms of each of the different modes of trade (cross-border supply; 
consumption abroad; trade presence; presence of natural persons).  
At any moment, irrespective of the development of the negotiations underway, 
countries are able to introduce new commitments on their lists. In contrast, the 
agreement establishes hurdles to the withdrawal of commitments already established 
(see article XXI of the GATS). As a result of this, the development of GATS aggravates 
and blocks a series of pro-market regulatory frameworks (Robertson and Dale 2003b). 
 
2. EduGATS: Measuring the degree of educational liberalization  
The rationale and the content of the lists of commitments reveal the necessary elements 
to calculate the degree of liberalization indicated by the lists themselves. Carrying out 
these calculations is necessary due to that fact that my exploration is developed at two 
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analytical levels. In the first, I observe the relation between the independent variables 
and the establishment (‘yes’ or ‘no’) of liberalization commitments in the educational 
sector from member countries. At the second level of analysis, I observe the relation 
between the same explicative variables with the ‘degree’ of commitment to 
liberalization. In this case, I only contemplate those countries that have adopted some 
liberalization commitment in education. To realize the analysis at this level means 
having to effectively measure the degree of commitments that has been established by 
member countries. To date, measuring the degree of liberalization commitments has not 
been done in a precise manner. For instance, agencies such as the OECD and the WTO 
itself usually report on the GATS results referring only to the number of sub sectors 
committed as a main indicator (OECD 2002b; WTO 2005). Thus, I have constructed a 
new index for doing this measurement, which I call EduGATS. This index is also useful 
to compare the liberalization degree of higher education with the liberalization degree of 
other education levels. Finally, it is worthwhile to mention that the formula to calculate 
EduGATS could be applied to explore the liberalization degree in other sectors 
contemplated by GATS. Nevertheless, in this research I apply it exclusively to the 
education sector and its corresponding sub sectors. 
 
Calculation of EduGATS 
When calculating EduGATS, I take into account the following factors: a) The 
educational sub sectors committed; b) Limitations in Market Access and National 
Treatment, which may vary depending on the sub sectors and the four trading modes; 
and c) Horizontal commitments, which are transversal to the sectorial commitments. 
The basic premise is that the higher the number of limitations in the lists of 
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commitments – see each of the items aforementioned - the lower the degree of trade 
openness.  
The formula to calculate EduGATS considers that, in terms of Market Access, 
six limitations may be included. Therefore, for each sub sector (y), MAx=(6-L)/6 
(where x makes reference to each trade mode and L is the number of limitations 
established, including those present in the horizontal commitments). Additionally, I 
consider that there are eight possible limitations in National Treatment so that NTx=(8-
L)/8. Actually, there are unlimited limitations to National Treatment. However, I 
consider that eight is an appropriate number because it is the number of National 
Treatment limitations suggested in the most exhaustive list detected - see (WTO 2000).  
EduGATS is the result of adding both factors. Once weighted, it may have a value 
between zero (for totally closed sectors) and one (maximum openness). The resulting 
formula is: EduGATS = Σy(MAx) + Σy(NTx). 
 
3. Liberalization of Higher Education. The State of Play 
In recent decades, trade in higher education services has increased much more than 
trade in other education services. This is reflected in all the modes of supply and in the 
emergence of a wide range of new ‘for profit’ providers (OBHE 2002; OBHE 2003; 
Rodríguez Gómez 2003). Therefore, higher education is the education sector under the 
much pressure to be internationally liberalized. For instance, in the Doha Round context 
the unique plurilateral request on education has been focused on Private Higher 
Education and Other Private Education Services2. 
Nevertheless, as shall be seen in this section, this trend is not already reflected in 
the liberalization commitments undertaken in the GATS framework. To date, fifty-
seven WTO member countries have included at least one education sub sector in their 
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lists of commitments, and forty-eight of them have established commitments in higher 
education.3 In the Figure 1, I show the percentage of sub sectors liberalized by these 
fifty-seven member countries. As can be seen, higher education is liberalized with the 
same frequency as secondary education and slightly more than primary education. 
“Other Educational Services” is not so greatly liberalized probably because, as some 
negotiators state, it is not clear which kind of education services are contemplated 
within this category. Finally, Adult Education is slightly more liberalized than higher 
education. 
 
XXXXXXXXXXXXX FIGURE 1 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
 
When the EduGATS is applied to capture the level of liberalization commitments 
adopted by countries, it is possible to observe that the level of liberalization of higher 
education is slightly higher than the level of liberalization for the average of education 
sectors. This is a common pattern for most of the member countries and it does not 
depend on the level of economic development of the countries as can be observed in the 
Tables 1, 2, 3 and 4. It must be said that I adopt the economic development categories 
applied by the WTO in its Services Data Base.  
 
XXXXXXXXXXXXX TABLE 1 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXXXXXXX TABLE 2 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXXXXXXX TABLE 3 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXXXXXXX TABLE 4 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
 
 
In the following maps I can compare the general EduGATS with Higher Education 
EduGATS for all the WTO member countries. The maps show which countries have 
liberalized education (figure 3) and higher education (figure 2) within GATS, as well as 
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to what extend they have done it. The exact value of EduGATS for each country can be 
consulted in the previous tables. The maps also reflect that Northern Countries usually 
have greater and more numerous liberalization commitments in higher education, as 
well as in other education sub sectors. This north-south “gap” will be developed and 
explained in the next section. 
XXXXXXXXXXXXX FIGURE 2 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXXXXXXX FIGURE 3 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
 
Finally, the EduGATS value can be compared depending on the modes of supply and 
the education sub sectors. In this case, as table 5 shows, trade openness is quite 
homogenous between the sub sectors, but it is not so similar between the various modes 
of supply. Specifically, with respect to mode 4 (movement of natural people), 
commitments are undertaken less intensely as compared with the other modes. This 
reflects that, within the GATS negotiations, member countries usually reject the 
acquisition of commitments that could mean the modification of migration rules, visa 
requirements and other regulations related to the international movement of workers. 
 
XXXXXXXXXXXXX TABLE 5 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
 
4. The higher education liberalization rationale  
The majority of the WTO members has not yet liberalized Higher Education and other 
education services in the GATS framework. Specifically, and after health care, 
educational services is the sector in which the members of WTO have established the 
fewest commitments on liberalization. The situation is very different in other service 
sectors contemplated by the agreement, as there are sectors that have been highly 
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liberalized, such as tourism and travel services – committed by 129 member countries – 
or financial services – committed by 107 countries4. 
In order to understand the reasons why liberalization in education advances 
more slowly than in other sectors, it must be considered that education and, for 
example, health or water supply are sectors in which the state provision normally 
predominates and which are fundamental services for the effective implementation of a 
series of social rights. Consequently, in the framework of the GATS negotiations, 
sectors of these characteristics are known as “sensitive sectors”. In fact, some 
governments, normally progressive and often under pressure from the civil society, have 
stated publicly that they will not liberalize this kind of services (Verger and Bonal 2006; 
Kachur 2003).  
In short, the non-liberalization of education opted for by most of the WTO 
member countries may be influenced by the awareness about the effects of GATS 
commitments on sensitive sectors. Some of these effects could be the limitation of the 
regulatory capacity of the states (Robertson, Bonal et al. 2002; Robertson and Dale 
2003) or the alteration of the education quality control (Knight 2002; Rodrigues Dias 
2002). 
Nevertheless, in spite of the fact that there are common elements that hinder 
liberalization in all member countries, the results of the negotiations in the area of 
educational services vary widely between members. In order to examine this variation 
in the countries behavior in GATS negotiations, in the following sections, I analyze the 
factors associated with the liberalization of higher education and other educational 
services. I will mainly focus on two hypothetical explanatory factors: a) the 
characteristics and needs of the member countries’ educational systems, and b) the 
countries’ degree of economic development.  
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 a) Influence of educational-system features  
In this section, I contrast the influence of several characteristics within the education 
systems with the acquisition and intensity of liberalization commitments, as suggested 
in some of the existing literature on the topic (Knight, 2002; Larsen et al, 2004; Mundy 
and Iga, 2003). Specifically, the variables I refer to are the private funding of education 
(families), state subsidies to the private sector, the enrolment share in the private sector 
and the foreign students flows abroad (importation of higher education services). The 
indicators to measure these variables come from OECD (2001) and UNESCO (2006).  
After exploring the aforementioned variables related to the characteristics of 
educational systems, I find out that there are only two of them that maintain a stronger 
relationship with liberalization. I refer here to the enrolment share in the private sector 
and to the percentage of state subsidies that the private sector receives. This relation is 
only contrasted at the level of Higher Education. There is no relation in other education 
levels. As can be observed in the two figures below, both factors are associated with the 
establishment of commitments in education, but not with the degree of these 
commitments (both variables have quantitative values, but in order to ensure greater 
viability of statistical analysis, I have converted them into qualitative variables.).  
 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXX FIGURES 4 AND 5 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX  
 
In the figure 4, it can be observed how the larger the presence of the private sector in 
higher education in a country is associated with a lower frequency of establishment of 
commitments in the educational sector. This may be due to the fact that governments 
believe the domestic educational supply (state and private) to be sufficiently wide and, 
consequently, deem it unnecessary to facilitate the entrance of foreign suppliers into 
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their educational systems by means of GATS. Another plausible explanation is that, due 
to its strong position, the private sector has the ability to bring pressure to bear on 
governments so that they do not liberalize education in the framework of GATS and 
therefore avoid having to compete with foreign suppliers. Regarding this issue, for 
instance, Mundy and Iga (2003) document that the lobby of  private universities in the 
USA is very active and effective when exercising pressure on the Congress not to 
liberalise the higher education sector. Second, as can be seen in the figure 5, those 
countries that provide more subsidies to the private sector acquire fewer commitments. 
This relationship may indicate that those countries that heavily subsidize their domestic 
private sector are not ready to apply the same rules on subsidies to foreign educational 
centers. Additionally it would be plausible to consider, once again, the pressure brought 
to bear by the higher education private sector, which would be biased towards non-
liberalization and would be motivated by the fact that private centers are not willing to 
“share the cake” of state funding with foreign suppliers.  
On the other hand, I did not find a relation between the ‘higher education 
services level of imports’ and the liberalization commitments within the GATS. There 
are countries that facilitate the trade of education flows because they have adopted a 
strategy of capacity building and attracting expertise and knowledge from abroad. They 
would use the GATS and other trade forums to provoke this capacity building process. 
It seems to be the case of countries such as China and Malaysia (Larsen et al, 2004; 
Zhang, 2003). But my statistical analysis shows that this is no a policy that could be 
globally attributed to most of the countries, at least, when only the education trade flows 
are taken into account. The adoption of this strategy could be more common in 
developing countries, but I also found out that the non-relation between education 
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imports and GATS commitments is a common pattern in all the countries, 
independently of their level of economic development. 
Finally, I neither find that the private funding of education is statistically related 
to the degree of educational liberalization in the countries studied. This contradicts 
Mundy and Iga (2003) results, which show that there is a reverse relationship between 
education liberalization within the GATS and public spending in education. They 
explain this apparent “paradox” saying that the countries with higher liberalization 
commitments (which are, very often, developed European countries) “are relatively 
confident of their national ability to buffer dislocations to educational systems caused 
by the liberalization” (pp. 312).  However, when applying the EduGATS, I do not 
contrast this statistical association - neither in relation to the education sector in general 
nor in relation to the higher education level. This difference in the results obtained by 
Mundy & Iga (2003) and I are the consequence of the different methods we used and, 
specifically, on the way of measuring liberalization commitments – see a deeper 
discussion on this in Verger (2008). Nevertheless, what I want to highlight is that 
numerous education and social scientists – I include myself among them - are trying to 
identify education rationales in the countries’ trade policy for education and, on 
occasions, we are forcing some of the explanations and hypothesis. Probably, instead of 
assuming that, in the GATS context, there is a causal relationship between the education 
necessities or strategies of the countries, our principal and preliminary research question 
should be: is there an ‘education-oriented rationale’ in the GATS negotiations? 
 
b) Influence of countries’ degree of development  
The countries’ degree of development is strongly related to the establishment of 
commitments on liberalization in education, both in the education sector and in the 
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higher education sub sector. As shown in Figures 6 and 7, the southern countries – 
which is a category that contemplate both developing countries and less developed 
countries (LDCs) - are more reticent to establish commitments in the area of educational 
services than are the northern – developed countries and transition countries.  
XXXXXXXXXXXXXX FIGURE 6 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXX FIGURE 7 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
 
According to the interviews done to the trade negotiators from southern countries, the 
GATS is perceived, on occasions, as a suitable instrument to attract direct investment 
and expertise to educational systems, especially for those education levels, in particular 
higher education, that usually are under-funded by the state. That is, GATS can be a 
market solution for the limitation on state investment in education. So, why are southern 
countries much more reticent to establish liberalization commitments on higher 
education and other education services than northern countries? There are different 
factors that could explain this, but our first argument is based on the idea that Southern 
countries should perceive more “threats” or drawbacks than benefits in opening up trade 
within their education systems.  
First at all, it should be considered that developing countries are almost net 
importers of higher education (OECD 2002). Consequently, educational centers in 
many of these countries do not only have great difficulties in accessing global 
educational markets, but trade liberalization may also mean that they are expelled from 
their own markets by the foreign competition (Barrow, Didou-Aupetit et al. 2003; 
Rodríguez Gómez 2004). Additionally, many Southern countries should be aware that 
trade liberalization as envisaged in GATS may introduce considerable complexity – as 
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well as limitations – into the area of the domestic regulation and financing of 
educational systems (Malo 2003). In fact, developing countries do not usually have 
already suitable legal and technical mechanisms to evaluate the quality of international 
(or domestic) higher education services. The internationalization of education in many 
Southern countries has often led to the multiplication of “diploma-mills” or “garage-
universities” (Carnoy 1999; García-Guadilla 2002), terms that indicate the low quality 
of the services provided. Finally, some southern countries associate GATS 
commitments to a possible accentuation of the brain drain problem, which is usually a 
bigger problem for the poor countries than for the rich ones (Knight, 2003; Wende, 
2003).  
Nevertheless, the development perspective seems appropriate when analyzing 
the liberalization of educational services in the WTO framework due to other reasons. 
One of them is that southern countries usually condition their services offers on the 
outcome of negotiations concerning other issues included in the competences of the 
WTO, in which they have more offensive interests. I refer to sectors such as agriculture, 
cotton or textiles. Guided by this rationale, some delegations that have not liberalized 
education recognize that the educational sector might become a ‘bargaining-chip’ 
during negotiations. The bargaining-chip rationale contradicts frontally the education 
rationale I have just explained. To ascertain which the dominant rationale in the WTO 
forum is, more qualitative data would be needed. In any case, I have observed that both 
rationales coexist in the GATS negotiations in the education field. 
  However, developing countries are not always “less liberal” than developed 
countries in the education field. If EduGATS is crossed with the ‘modes of supply’ and 
the level of economic development variables, it is evident that, as the figure 8 shows, 
mode 4 (movement of natural people) is the only mode for which the developed 
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countries are less ‘open to trade’ than the rest. To a large extent, this is explained by the 
fact that rich countries consider establishing commitments in mode 4 to be incompatible 
with their immigration policies (Saner and Fasel 2003). In contrast, mode 4 is the mode 
for which many Southern countries would like to see more advances, as they consider 
that their comparative advantage in the trade in services mainly lies in the export of 
“human resources” (UNCTAD 2005). Specifically, the interest of the Southern 
countries in this trade mode is in the income they receive from transfers made by their 
workers abroad (Shashikant 2005). 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXX FIGURE 8 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
  
Conclusions 
Liberalization of higher education and other education services in the framework of 
trade agreements, such as the GATS, is a new and hot issue in the international agenda 
of education. Thus, to analyze the rationale of countries’ decisions in relation to the 
liberalization of education becomes more and more necessary. My research, which 
combines qualitative and quantitative techniques, aims to reveal how different factors 
and features of the countries are related to the outcomes of the GATS negotiations. 
Specifically, I have explored the level of relation between several independent variables 
(higher education public spending, weight of the private education sector, level of 
economic development of the countries, etc.) with the GATS results in the education 
sector. The research also shows that the index I have constructed, the EduGATS, is a 
helpful tool to analyze the state of play of GATS negotiations in the education field. In 
this article, EduGATS has permitted to us to compare higher education liberalization 
with that of other education sectors. However, the formula used to calculate the 
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EduGATS could also be applied to analyze the liberalization level of other services 
sectors.  
In relation to the latter point, I have found out that, in the GATS framework, 
higher education has been liberalized at a very similar level as the other regulated 
education levels (primary and secondary). Higher education is the education sub sector 
where trade flows are bigger and, consequently, trade liberalization pressures and 
demands are more intense. Nevertheless, these pressures have not been reflected, until 
now, in the frequency of the liberalization commitments done by member countries. 
They have neither been clearly reflected in the liberalization level, as can be observed 
when the EduGATS is applied.   
In relation to the liberalization factors, I have come to two main conclusions. The 
first one is that, contradicting existing assumptions that are usual in the GATS and 
education literature, certain characteristics of higher education systems are not 
statistically related (at least in a way that can be globally extrapolated) with the results 
of GATS negotiations. The second conclusion is that the North-South divide is an 
important explanatory factor to understand the GATS outcomes in the education field. 
Both rich and poor countries perceive common risks to the liberalization of its 
educational sector in the framework of the Agreement. Among others, I refer to limits 
on the regulatory space for the states that the establishment of commitments entails, or 
to the fact that opening up trade in education is a policy opposed by many education 
stakeholders. Nevertheless, developing countries consider additional elements when 
negotiating GATS. These countries do not generally have offensive interests in the 
liberalization of higher education as their universities could hardly be expected to be 
able to penetrate a highly liberalized global education market. Furthermore, faced with 
international competition, the southern countries’ educational centers would undergo an 
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erosion of the market share within their own territories. These and other problems could 
explain why numerous southern countries tend to adopt a defensive attitude when 
negotiating education liberalization and, consequently, why there is an obvious gap 
between the commitments of northern and southern countries in this area. However, 
many southern countries are considering the liberalization of education in exchange for 
other countries liberalizing other sectors in which they have more offensive interests 
such as agriculture or textiles. Therefore, these countries would opt for “sacrificing” 
their education sector if it means to get benefits in other economic sectors. 
After several postponements, the Doha Round and the services liberalization 
negotiations – as one of the pillars of the round – are still ongoing. Thus, in this 
moment, there is no available data on the definitive changes in the multilateral trade 
regime as a result of the Doha negotiations. However, most of the member countries 
have submitted their first offers on the services area, which become a first valuable 
source to analyze the global trend of liberalization of education. When checking the 
already published lists of offers (see the ‘WTO on-line documents data base’: 
http://www.wto.org/wto/ddf/ep/search.html), we observe that several developing 
countries, such as Pakistan, Korea, India, Peru, Colombia, Singapore and Bahrain are 
willing to open their higher education sector and/or other education sectors to global 
trade. This means than, after Doha, the existing north-south gap in the liberalization 
commitments could become smaller. In fact, the list of countries with education 
commitments could become longer depending on the “level of ambition” – as trade 
negotiations say – acquired by the round. Anyway, we will have to wait until the end of 
the Doha Round to extract more firm conclusions on the evolution of the new global 
regime of trade in education services as well as to more deeply analyze which is the 
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‘education rationale’ (or whether or not there is an identifiable ‘education rationale’) 
behind the constitution of this regime.  
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Table 1. EduGATS in developed countries 
 
Countries 
Higher 
Education Average for all sub sectors) 
Australia 0,59 0,36 
Austria 0 0,43 
Belgium 0,64 0,51 
Denmark 0,61 0,49 
France 0,55 0,45 
Germany 0,62 0,49 
Greece 0,58 0,48 
Ireland 0,62 0,49 
Italy 0,58 0,48 
Japan 0,21 0,2 
Liechtenstein 0,43 0,34 
Luxembourg 0,64 0,51 
Netherlands 0,64 0,51 
New Zealand 0,66 0,39 
Norway 0,55 0,44 
Portugal 0,62 0,49 
Spain 0,6 0,49 
Switzerland 0,7 0,4 
United Kingdom 0,64 0,51 
United States 0 0,23 
average 0,52 0,44 
 
 
Table 2. EduGATS in developing countries 
 
Countries 
Higher 
Education Average for all sub sectors) 
China 0,42 0,42 
Costa Rica 0 0,11 
Ghana 0 0,37 
Jamaica 0,81 0,49 
Jordan 0,65 0,55 
Mexico 0,70 0,56 
Oman 0,69 0,55 
Panama 0,57 0,34 
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Taiwan 0,70 0,52 
Thailand 0 0,29 
Trinidad and Tobago 0,33 0,20 
Turkey 0,91 0,63 
average 0,48 0,42 
 
Table 3. EduGATS in less developed countries 
 
Countries 
Higher 
Education Average for all sub sectors) 
Congo 0,76 0,15 
Cambodja 0,73 0,44 
Gambia 0 0,45 
Haiti 0 0,20 
Lesotho 0,89 0,89 
Mali 0 0,20 
Nepal 0,67 0,40 
Rwanda 0 0,2 
Sierra Leone 0,53 0,53 
average 0,40 0,38 
 
Table 4. EduGATS in transition countries 
 
Countries 
Higher 
Education Average for all sub sectors) 
Albania 0,92 0,7 
Armenia 0,86 0,34 
Bulgaria 0 0,30 
Croatia 0,72 0,52 
Czech Republic 0,38 0,68 
Estonia 0,75 0,75 
Georgia 0,62 0,52 
Hungary 0,70 0,56 
Kyrgyzstan 0,72 0,58 
Latvia 0,87 0,69 
Lithuania 0,77 0,61 
Macedonia 0,67 0,40 
Moldova 0,88 0,88 
Poland 0,62 0,50 
Slovakia 0,67 0,67 
Slovenia 0,65 0,39 
average 0,67 0,57 
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Figure 2. EduGATS for Higher Education 
 
 
 
Figure 3. EduGATS for all sectors 
  
Table 5. GATS commitments in education and modes of supply (EduGATS values) 
 Primary Secondary Higher 
Education 
Adult Other 
MODE 1 0,54 0,64 0,71 0,72 0,32 
MODE 2 0,63 0,73 0,73 0,76 0,34 
MODE 3 0,44 0,50 0,51 0,56 0,22 
MODE 4 0,17 0,21 0,20 0,23 0,12 
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Figure 4. Commitments depending on the weight of the private sector (left) 
Figure 5. Commitments depending on state subsidies to the private sector (right)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Commitments on education depending on the degree of economic development 
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Figure 7. Commitments on higher education depending on the degree of economic 
development 
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Figure 8. EduGATS depending on modes of supply 
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End Notes: 
 
1 This article contains results of the project “Más allá de la focalización: Educación, desarrollo y lucha 
contra la pobreza en el Cono Sur. Análisis de las aplicaciones de la nueva agenda política global en la 
región” (I+D 2005-2008). Ref. SEJ-04235. An article that contains a general assessment of the 
liberalization on all the education sectors has been published in the journal Globalisation, Societies and 
Education 6(1). 
2 The request can be consulted in http://commerce.nic.in/wto_sub/services/Plurilateral_Requests.htm 
[retrieved: 15/10/06] 
3 In these calculations we do not include the two newest members of the organization: Vietnam and 
Tonga. Both became formally members of the WTO in the year 2007. See: 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm [retrieved: 12/09/07]  
4 In these figures, I include the EU (or European Communities) as a single member – that is, the member 
countries are not included separately.  
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